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Ambient Drone and Apocalypse
Joanna Demers
Celer and The End of Happiness
A good time to listen to Celer’s music is early in the morning, around three 
o’clock. Any later, and road noise would drown it out. In the album Salvaged 
Violets, high– and low–pitched tones seep in, barely perceptible even on 
headphones. They are produced on synthesizers, processors of various sorts, 
and acoustic instruments, but their timbre is uniformly fragile. There are no 
abrupt attacks, and decays are always attenuated. These tones are too isolated 
to congeal into harmony; they merely align with each other momentarily, 
before washing out with the tide.
The disc player spins, and the laser reads the data. Naturally, this play-
back is identical to every other. It will be the same tomorrow, and however 
many tomorrows remain. I could well play this recording every morning, 
indefinitely, or at least until the electrical grid collapses. It would matter just 
as much to me if I heard it constantly, from now until the end.
Salvaged Violets might sound like other recent examples of pretty, quiet 
music. But this impression gives way with repeated listening, especially 
around the nine–minute mark. The sudden influx of rapidly oscillating 
drones, colliding as they compete for the same space, proves that this is not 
just a touristic celebration of beautiful sounds. This is the moment when one’s 
toes clench the precipice shortly before jumping, or the moment immediately 
preceding the apocalypse. Celer’s music, as with so much ambient drone, 
speaks of the end of time, the end of the world, and all the unresolvable 
dilemmas that accompany such ends.
Croesus was a Lydian king who believed himself blessed. He sought 
confirmation from Solon of Athens, the lawmaker revered for his wisdom. 
Croesus asks Solon, “Who is the happiest of all men?,” whereupon Solon 
answers with stories of humble men who live to old age in obscurity, or 
else who die young in their sleep after winning favor from some god. But 
Croesus wanted Solon to name him the happiest. Solon responds, “[Mark] 
this: until he is dead, keep the word ‘happy’ in reserve. Till then, he is not 
happy, but only lucky.”1 This passage from Herodotus is famous, but what 
follows is more important. Solon admonishes Croesus to “look to the end,” 
rather than the present. Croesus dismisses Solon, and only later learns the 
meaning in Solon’s words. He loses a son in a hunting accident. He concludes 
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two years of mourning with the decision to attack the Persians, and his oracle 
responds that he will “destroy a great empire.”2 Croesus is foolish enough 
to hear a presentiment of the fall of Persia, but the empire to fall is his own. 
It would then appear that Croesus is about to reach his own end as the 
prisoner of the Persian tyrant Cyrus. He is about to be burned alive on a 
pyre. As the flames char Croesus’ hair, Cyrus is moved to spare Croesus, but 
his men cannot stop the fire’s spread. Croesus prays to Apollo for mercy, 
clouds rush in on what was a perfectly clear sky, and rains put out the fire 
that was to mark Croesus’s final, unhappy ending. Croesus spends the rest 
of his days as a guest and prisoner in the Persian court, trotted out anytime 
his captors seek counsel on the behavior of an enemy or the proper course of 
war. It may well be that Croesus narrowly missed a horrible ending to what 
had been a blessed life, but strangest of all is his subsequent resurrection, 
the turnabout that made a king into a slave, a ruler into an advisor. 
I feel great joy, and great excitement. Something wonderful is com-
ing—liberation from our bodies—but it is also something terrible. Billions 
of people will suffer. There is no way for me to justify how I could feel happy, 
by what right I can smile given what I know. And it’s unclear whether what 
I feel is even happiness at all. How can it be, if it cannot last? One could 
rewrite the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics with apocalypse in mind: 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly 
been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is 
found in the time of apocalypse, when activities can no longer have ends. 
For naturally, in a time in which ends are irrelevant, when the final end 
precludes all other ends, the good takes on a different meaning. Where 
there are actions apart from ends, at least ends that lie in the future, it is 
the nature of the activities to stand apart from their products. We must 
thus concern ourselves with what right action and goodness are when the 
end is at hand. Now, as there have been many actions, arts, and sciences, 
their ends were also many; the end of economics was wealth, that of 
bomb–making a bomb, that of plastic manufacturing a plastic bottle. But 
where such arts meet with a certain end not only of one person, but of 
the entire civilization or even of the planet, the question of ends becomes 
moot. It now makes a great difference whether activities themselves are 
the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in 
the case of the sciences just mentioned.3
Aristotle writes that the ultimate end of human activity is happiness—
eudemonia. To attain eudemonia, we weigh present against future satisfac-
tion, balancing virtues against necessities. But Aristotle says that happiness 
must be measured over a lifetime, that it cannot be reduced to a single 
moment.4 Spoken with the confidence of someone assured of a long life. 
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What is the ultimate end in the time of apocalypse? If we accept Aristotle’s 
premise that it remains happiness, then how do we define happiness, and 
the virtues that inform our quest for happiness, when the end is imminent? 
We delude ourselves that we will live long lives, that our relative happi-
ness will be an average of joy and sorrow and boredom stretched out over 
the years. Apocalypse exposes this lie. It pushes us to take up Plato’s call in 
the Gorgias to stop thinking about how long we have, and instead about 
how best we might live in whatever time remains.5 The truth I know in my 
bones is that the end is coming soon. I don’t know when—a month from 
now, perhaps, or a week, or in five years. Eudemonia should be the same 
whether we live only five minutes more, or five decades more. I see all this, 
and yet the truth eludes me, for until recently, happiness has meant for me 
the idea of being happy at some point in the future or past, not the present. 
In the Gorgias, Zeus is said to have instituted a law that no one shall know 
their death ahead of time. Like that line at the end of Blade Runner: “Too 
bad she won’t live. But then again, who does?” This is supposed to be our 
final tip–off that Deckard, like Rachel, is a replicant, and has no more than 
three years to live. But what it really tells us is that apocalypse only magnifies 
mortality, something already there, on a mass scale. Every individual’s death 
is her own apocalypse, if only she would recognize it as such.
If Aristotle and Solon are right, then a life qualifies as happy only if it 
lasts a full duration, and ends happily. But if the apocalypse is drawing near, 
as it must considering our species’ efforts to bring it about, then all lives 
will have been cut short, and we will have died with the knowledge that the 
end was prematurely upon us. So none of us will be able to claim that we 
were happy in Aristotle’s or Solon’s terms. The only hope I have of proving 
these two Greeks wrong, of leaving evidence that I have known moments of 
blinding happiness, is to stop time even as it drags me with it. I now look to 
the end, but while searching for moments of joy that stop time altogether.
The music of Celer intimates what such happiness might feel like.6 It is 
achingly beautiful–loops of electronic tones, or field recordings or snatches 
of piano or cello fragments, played at low volumes. Celer is most coura-
geous when it bypasses noise and technical tricks. It sounds like what it is 
to watch the moon set over the ocean at night, or to see one’s beloved enter 
the room after a long absence. Celer’s music is usually constructed with 
loops that repeat for a half–hour, or perhaps over an hour. Their duration 
does not matter, for this music has bestowed on me a happiness that no 
one, not even someone blessed with contented old age, has experienced. 
Boethius understands the lightness with which we can let go, after having 
been granted such joy; writing in house arrest before his execution, he notes 
that no evil can destroy the memory of happiness.7 His optimism puts to 
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shame Aristotle, who was neither imprisoned nor condemned to death, and 
who was therefore tepid in his joy.
And so the spinning continues. There is the spinning of the disc player, 
going over the same zeroes and ones that it has read every morning since 
I began listening to Salvaged Violets. There is the spinning beating of the 
tones, sometimes constant, other times accelerating from dissonance back 
to consonance. These are toy tops of sound that whirl and gyrate, going so 
fast while going nowhere at all. Self–contained, they are monads that reflect 
all these worlds of happiness, each in their own particular way. Take any 
one of these oscillations, increase its speed to the point where individual 
revolutions disappear within a perceived uniform total, and what we have 
is an edifice of eternal happiness—eternal for however long it lasts. So it is 
with every successive wave of sound in Salvaged Violets.
The ethics of apocalypse starts with this—that it should be no different 
than ethics for those who assume that death will come only in the distant, 
unspecified future.
Aristotle’s definition of happiness requires that we remain virtuous, and 
virtue means that we “must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and 
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us.”8 But the 
immortal gods are none other than they who can live an eternity within a 
single moment—even if that moment is immediately followed by death. We 
mortals, however, are divorced from any comprehensive experience of time. 
We pass from moment to moment, too abject to grasp the unity in infinity; 
Plato, Aristotle, and Boethius all agree on this point. But Dostoyevsky knew 
better than all of them. He realized that one can live a lifetime of happiness 
within a few moments. He also understood that such moments come at 
great cost. In The Idiot, Prince Myshkin speaks of a prisoner about to be 
shot before his sentence was commuted. The convict systematically spends 
his last few minutes—five minutes, which “seemed to him an infinite time, 
a vast wealth”9—taking leave of his comrades, thinking for the last time not 
in a rushed, delirious fashion, but almost happy, serene, perhaps ecstatic. 
He stares at the golden cupola of a distant church glittering in the sunshine. 
And then,
he said that nothing was so dreadful at that time as the continual 
thought, “What if I were not to die! What if I could go back to life—
what eternity! And it would all be mine! I would turn every minute into 
an age; I would lose nothing, I would count every minute as it passed, I 
would not waste one!” He said that this idea turned into such a fury at 
last that he longed to be shot quickly.10
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And so it must have been for Dostoyevsky himself, who thought these 
same thoughts when he was about to be put to death for political conspiracy 
before being similarly spared. Such an event must have exacerbated his 
epilepsy. Indeed, Prince Myshkin, who is also epileptic, feels a similar elation 
in the seconds immediately before a seizure, a flash of light during which 
“he had time to say to himself clearly and consciously, ‘Yes, for this moment 
one might give one’s whole life!’.”11 The price for that moment is exorbitant: 
pain, idiocy, total disconnection from all the bliss of the preceding moment, 
disconnection too from every other human. Myshkin lives an apocalypse of 
sorts every time he has a seizure, from which it takes him months to recover. 
In the intervening time, he must rebuild himself. The cosmic epiphany he 
experienced is irretrievable, at least until his next seizure.
Celer’s music also intimates a dear price. I am thinking now of “Of 
My Complaisance,” from An Immensity Merely to Save A Life. Eighteen 
minutes of a fragment lasting thirty–five seconds that is looped, with no 
variation, until the track’s close. The fragment consists of a short melody 
plus harmonic accompaniment played on the strings–setting of a synthesizer. 
There is ample reverb, and although there is a definite, discernible melody, 
the texture is smooth, with no percussive breaks or attacks. This melody for 
the most part outlines a major key, descending at first, until at its low point 
accompanying strings arrive on a single, held pitch high up in the ether. This 
is Prokofiev’s old trick, to land on low and high notes simultaneously, and 
just as in Prokofiev’s music, the gesture here seems to open a wide space that 
is beautiful and cavernous, terrifying. The bottom drops out.
Celer’s music is always beautiful. I don’t like relying on that word time 
and again, but one can’t overlook what “beautiful” means in the context of 
electronic music these days. So much electronica has assimilated ugliness 
and dissonance. Witness the very genre called “noise,” plus distillations of 
noise elements in glitch, drone, and metal. Celer stands apart by not relying 
on noise. A few other artists fall into this category: William Basinski, drone 
artists Capricornus, Kyle Bobby Dunn, and David Tagg, and other ambient 
drone artists who use either drone–sustained sonorities or loops to create 
multi–minute or –hour works of unmitigated beauty and consonance. 
I mentioned just now the steep price of this music. This price is central to 
Celer’s story: the group began as a duo of Will Long and Danielle Basquet–
Long, a married couple in their twenties. Their music and track titles, along 
with their photos taken from worldwide travels, shows a grand amour, not 
merely the happy burgeoning love of youth, but the love that, when it finds 
its beloved, says, “Ah yes, I’ve been waiting for you patiently. We’ve a lot of 
living to do, you and I.” Danielle Basquet–Long died of an undiagnosed 
heart condition in 2009, and Will Long has since released several recordings 
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featuring their work as a couple, Danielle’s solo project Chubby Wolf, and 
Will’s work as Celer. Any of these tracks sound like they could go on forever, 
and perhaps are currently going on forever in some other space. This is music 
of heaven, how we all might hope the afterlife to be, with no hint of kitsch. A 
few moments in this music might indeed be fair recompense for a lifetime’s 
worth of disappointment, aggravation, and boredom. But the threat of an 
abrupt end—apocalypse—is latent in this music, too.
This sort of happiness confounds Aristotle’s theory; we can experience 
happiness even if we do not have a complete life. We might hope for long, 
prosperous lives, with our material needs met, and with adequate freedom 
and opportunity for contemplation. But Aristotle here does not think with 
the mind or heart of a mystic. And a mystic is exactly what we need, someone 
who knows the liberation of which ambient drone speaks. A mystic like 
Hegel understands that happiness must contain its other, the end of hap-
piness, just as infinity contains the finite. For Hegel, finite things contain 
“the germ of decease”; they are born at the same time that they die.12 Celer 
explains what happiness—the ultimate end—would look like in a time of 
apocalypse because it reveals that true happiness of any sort is both eternal 
and susceptible to extinction at any moment.
There is no apocalypse, because apocalypse has always been, and will 
always be with us.
Thomas Köner and the End of the World
History abounds with tales of military leaders who risk everything for the 
end of the world, which might lie just over the hill. The Persian king Cyrus 
was a tactical savant, a political prodigy, whose arrogance undid everything 
those qualities had won him. He conquered Greece, Babylon, all of what 
is now Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Not content with those lands, he continued 
eastward into the land of the Massagetae, the nomadic tribes who lived in 
what is now Turkmenistan. The first real resistance his forces encountered 
came in the form of the queen Tomyris. Cyrus began his invasion with 
a marriage proposal; she refused. Cyrus proceeded to prepare a military 
incursion, which prompted the first of Tomyris’ prophetic threats: Cyrus 
must leave, although Tomyris knows he will not. Tomyris then proposes a 
limited engagement between the two armies in a location of Cyrus’ choosing, 
a means of containing the battle and its ravages. Cyrus eventually accepts 
these terms, and succeeds in introducing Tomyris’ men to alcohol. Cyrus’ 
army then slaughters the drunk Massagetae and captures Tomyris’ grown 
son. She issues her second prophetic threat: release her son and leave her 
country. “If you refuse,” she adds, “I swear by the sun our master to give you 
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more blood than you can drink, for all your gluttony.”13 Cyrus frees Tomyris’ 
son, who promptly kills himself. A battle ensues, one Herodotus claims is 
the bloodiest in history. Cyrus is killed, and Tomyris stuffs his decapitated 
head “into a skin which she had filled with human blood”14, to fulfill her 
prophecy that Cyris would inebriate himself with blood.
Tomyris’ roles in this story are multiple, and for that reason, unusual 
in a text where women seldom receive more than passing mention. She is 
a female body, a military commander, and a prophetess. She knows that 
Cyrus will not content himself with what he already possesses, and uses the 
very image of binging on blood to devise his punishment. And while Cyrus 
could have heeded Tomyris’ warnings, he persists, just as she predicts. His 
disregard for her prophecy is part of the prophecy.
Subsequent generals have learned nothing from Cyrus. Alexander also 
invaded the East, driving into Afghanistan and India before his troops forced 
a westward retreat. Alexander pulled his men back to Babylon before dying 
of a fever under suspicious circumstances, perhaps due to poisoning. Several 
centuries later, the Roman emperor Julian hoped to recreate Alexander’s 
campaign; he was murdered, probably by conspirators from within his 
army. These men knew what awaited Cyrus and themselves in their search 
for the east–most point. So did the Soviets and Americans who, in the name 
of homeland security or oil, pursued their own mad searches for the next 
mountain or cave that hid whatever enemy propaganda could conjure. Logic 
and history would have demanded that foreign occupiers halt and embed 
themselves within land they already controlled. Wealth and territory alone do 
not compel these invaders. So what drove these commanders to risk and lose 
everything, including, in the case of Cyrus and Alexander, their very lives?
When I was eleven years old, I spent two weeks at a summer soccer camp 
on Catalina Island. It was my first time away from my parents for longer 
than a night. I was excited to go, for I was used to seeing the island from my 
house, and had wanted to cross the channel for as long as I could remember. 
But after only a day, I wanted to leave. I stopped eating, cried in the middle 
of practice, games, mealtime and especially at bedtime. I was nervous for 
two weeks straight. The only time I was able to forget my grief—I suppose 
that it was fear that something would happen to my parents while I was away 
from them, and I would never see them again—was when our camp hiked 
to the isthmus, the mile–long flat strip of land that linked what in an earlier 
geological era were probably two separate islands. But this hike did not turn 
my depression into happiness. I was rather merely distracted, preoccupied 
with concerns indicative of mania. What does it mean to cross an island? 
The windward, west–facing side had always seemed to me an enigma. I often 
wondered how different it would be from the mainland–facing side. How 
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much more remote was it? And from that westward side, would I be able to 
see distant San Clemente, the island my brother told me had been blasted 
into flatness after decades of US Naval exercises, an island hidden from view 
from the Los Angeles coast? How would it feel to reach such a definitive end, 
albeit a geographical end, of the only world I knew after such a short walk?
I found what should have been satisfying responses to these questions 
when we reached the isthmus. It did indeed feel different on the far side 
of the island. It was windier, the waves were rougher, and there were no 
people or buildings. And yet, it was not entirely alien either. The craggy cliffs 
resembled those on the shore of the Palos Verdes peninsula where I lived, 
and the golden hills covered with oak and sage brush were like anything in 
the valleys north of Los Angeles. I was now present where previously I had 
only fantasized of going, and it was all disarmingly matter–of–fact. But that 
presence collapsed into a new absence, a new fixation: the other side of that 
ocean that extended itself over the next hemisphere. I began to wish that I 
could see all the way to Japan and China through the curvature of the earth. 
I wanted to see further, to go further to find that new end of the earth that 
my fellow campers and I had so casually pushed back.
Cyrus, awakening early one morning east of the Caspian Sea, must have 
felt the same way. Though he marched further east than any Greek or Persian 
before him, he did not succeed in discovering the end of the world. He merely 
displaced that limit to some new location beyond the next mountain range. 
And that only tantalized him to the point of lunacy, such that, twice hearing 
Tomyris’ predictions of disaster, all he could do was to look away toward 
the east, pretend not to hear or believe, and march off a cliff to oblivion and 
blood–engorgement. Prophecy should slacken our thirst for the end of the 
world, to find the end of the world. It does no such thing.
A friend recently returned from a ten–day cruise to Alaska. Among his 
fellow shipmates were several baby boomers who applauded and oohed at the 
sight of melting glaciers, with apparently no trace of irony. There flickered 
in their well–meaning faces no awareness that human actions have made 
the collapse of the Arctic into entertainment. He saw a lake the size of San 
Diego’s Mission Bay, one that a year ago had been a solid glacier. The tour 
guides said that this sort of cruise would no longer be marketable in a few 
years given the current rate of melting. The glaciers and fjords would be 
gone, replaced with oversized puddles. And yet there was still enough of 
a sense of what used to be there for my friend to fall sadly in love with the 
place. Where the world’s lines of longitude converge into a single pole, the 
past and future meet. The prophecy of the Arctic has been clear enough 
for some time, at least for those not intent on denial. And that prophecy 
addresses humanity just as Tomyris addressed Cyrus, warning him of the 
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future even as it acknowledges the futility of that warning. That end of the 
world, that geographical extremity, is perhaps where we can foresee the end 
of the world most clearly.
I will not make it to the Arctic before the end. But I have some record-
ings by Thomas Köner, and so I go there late at night, when the sounds of 
the outside world have momentarily abated. Köner’s recordings all share a 
tendency to evade not only description, but even the sense that one has even 
listened to them at all. In “Teimo,” for instance, waves of low–frequency 
drones and rumbles wash in and out like the tide, and higher tones oc-
casionally enter.15 Köner knows the Arctic well—he spent some years of his 
childhood in the region—and can evoke the Arctic’s vastness and emptiness 
better than any other sound artist or composer has ever done. Just like 
Celer, he knows the power of pairing the very low with the very high, but 
to this he adds the very slow movement of a glacier. (At least they used to 
be slow. As my friend assures me, they break apart quickly now.) And so the 
most remarkable thing about Köner’s music is the sense that one has not, 
and cannot, apprehend it in its entirety. So much of it eludes perception by 
dwelling at the extremes of our acoustic or temporal perception. Change 
thus manifests only in retrospect, when it suddenly becomes audible that 
the texture of a track’s end is far different from its beginning. Instead, Köner 
relentlessly posits an elsewhere, an extreme point, something to which we 
strain to listen and whose position we hope someday to reach. Failing that, 
for of course we will utterly fail in that campaign, we merely sit back and 
listen to what sounds like eternity, something unknowable, unfathomable, 
and unchanging.
Notes
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15. Thomas Köner, Nunatuk—Teimo—Permafrost. Type Recordings, 2010. TYPE 072.
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